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Corporate Governance and International Business 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article sets out a framework for the analysis of corporate governance and international 
business. We take a broad perspective on corporate governance mechanisms and consider 
possible synergies between corporate governance and international business (IB) research. We 
summarize the papers included in this Focused Issue, and draw out their main contributions to 
the literature. We compare and contrast four theoretical perspectives concerning corporate 
governance and IB: transaction cost economics (TCE), the resource-based view (RBV), 
agency theory (AT), and institutional theory (IT). We highlight five research themes 
(international diversification, business groups, entry modes, subsidiary mandates, and new 
international ownership structures) where future work explicitly addressing governance issues 
may prove fruitful.   
 3
Introduction 
 Corporate governance theory is exerting an increasing influence upon research in a 
wide variety of disciplines (Keasey, Thompson and Wright, 1997, 2005). In a broad sense, 
corporate governance is about how firms should be governed so that they are run effectively 
and efficiently. Good corporate governance ensures that additional resources are allocated 
sufficiently productively to keep all stakeholders satisfied. By the same token, when resources 
must be reduced, good governance achieves adequate cost reductions. Whatever the national 
and international economic conditions, efficient governance enables firms to survive and 
generate returns that are sufficient to retain the commitment of salient stakeholders.   
The perspective of traditional Anglo-American agency theory emphasizes the role of 
corporate governance as ensuring that the firm operates in the interests of shareholders (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Keasey and Wright, 1993). Corporate governance focuses on 
accountability, in order to minimize downside risks to shareholders, and on enabling 
management to exercise enterprise in order to assure that shareholders benefit from the upside 
potential of firms (Filatotchev and Wright, 2005).  
In some jurisdictions the shareholder view may be seen as overly narrow since it does 
not take account of other stakeholders who may have different interests. The firm may also be 
viewed as an independent entity, where the role of corporate governance mechanisms is to 
support what is best for the firm per se. The varieties of capitalism literature (Hall and 
Gingerich, 2001), property rights theory (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), team production 
theory (Blair and Stout, 1998) and the strategy literature (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Barney 
1991; Filatotchev and Wright, 2005) provide insights in these contexts. 
 We take a broad perspective on corporate governance mechanisms. In terms of 
shareholders, we embrace the nature and role of owners, boards of directors and the role of 
outside directors, separation of CEOs and Board Chairs, executive remuneration, financial 
reporting, and the market for corporate control. Managers’ and shareholders’ interests are 
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more likely to be aligned the greater is the overlap between ownership and management, 
although high managerial equity ownership can lead to entrenchment behavior. Concentrated 
ownership can avoid the free-riding problems associated with monitoring in corporations with 
diffuse shareholdings, but may convey private benefits of control that are not in the interests 
of shareholders as a whole. Boards of directors are responsible for representing the interests 
of shareholders in the running of the firm through the hiring, monitoring and replacement of 
management. Single tier boards, typically a feature of Anglo-American environments, contain 
both executive and non-executive (outside) directors and raise the problem that if insiders are 
a majority, monitoring by outside directors may be ineffective. The separation of the roles of 
CEO and Board Chair is argued to resolve the duality problem where the board is dominated 
by an insider. Boards set executive remuneration and a key governance objective is to ensure 
that this is sensitive to performance in such a way that managers’ and shareholders’ interests 
are aligned.  Financial reporting regimes are especially important for two reasons. On the one 
hand, they provide the basis for the disclosure of reliable information on which to base 
governance actions. On the other hand, the increasing involvement of institutional investors 
and other sources of finance capital mean that firms are increasingly obliged to meet targets 
for a range of accounting measures, and this has an impact upon firm strategy (Andersson et 
al., 2008). Finally, the market for corporate control arguably provides an external governance 
mechanism involving the threat or actuality of takeover if managers’ behavior diverges too far 
from shareholders’ interests. 
 Beyond shareholders as a subset of stakeholders as a whole, dual tier boards 
distinguish between supervisory and executive boards, the former representing a range of 
stakeholders, e.g. employees and banks. Interlocked directorships may effectively combine 
firms without formal takeover. Besides share ownership and board representation, 
stakeholders may influence important firm decisions through a variety of channels, including 
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strikes, political influence and use of the media. The state may effectively exercise corporate 
governance through a range of administrative devices, subsidies, permits, etc.   
 There is extensive evidence relating to the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance across a variety of institutional contexts. It is not the 
purpose of this paper to review this literature (for extensive reviews see e.g., Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Keasey, Thompson and Wright, 2005) but a brief overview will set the scene 
for our more focused examination of the IB context. Evidence from various countries shows 
that boards with more outside directors are more likely to dismiss top management and that 
there is a negative relationship between board size and performance (Denis and McConnell, 
2005). While there is considerable evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom 
in particular on the typically weak relationship between executive pay and performance, this 
has only become available in some other countries only recently (e.g. Buck, Liu and 
Skovoroda, 2008).  
There is mixed evidence from the United States on the relationship between ownership 
concentration (blockholders) and firm performance. Worldwide evidence on the influence of 
blockholders on performance varies both by country and the nature of the blockholder but in 
general is more positive than in the United States. Shareholders may gain private benefits 
from control rights that exceed the proportion of shares they own, such as through pyramid 
structures, keiretsus, chaebols, cross-holdings, dual class shares, etc. These mechanisms are 
widespread outside the United States (Claessens et al.., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002). The 
international evidence suggests that the accumulation of control rights in excess of cash flow 
rights reduces the market value of firms. Research has also examined the impact of regulatory 
and legal issues on corporate governance across countries and indicates that concentrated 
ownership is a rational response in contexts where minority investors are not protected. 
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 In this Introduction, we first consider the possible synergies between corporate 
governance and international business (IB) research. We then summarize the five papers 
included in this Focused Issue, and draw out their main contributions to the literature. The 
five papers use a variety of theoretical perspectives - notably transaction cost economics 
(TCE), the resource-based view (RBV), agency theory (AT), and institutional theory (IT) – 
and several integrate more than one theoretical perspective. We next compare and contrast 
these four theoretical perspectives, and emphasize the complementarities between them. In the 
penultimate section, we highlight five research themes (international diversification, business 
groups, entry modes, subsidiary mandates, and new international ownership structures) where 
future work explicitly addressing governance issues may prove fruitful. The final section 
concludes.  
 
Corporate Governance and International Business Research 
 As yet, there has been little work on how different governance components impact 
firms’ strategic decisions, such as whether, when, where and how to internationalize, and 
upon how firms organize and manage their activities across national boundaries1. IB research 
has typically focused on the strategies of MNEs for global expansion in diverse regions and 
countries, with an emphasis on corporate and business level strategies. Furthermore, although 
there has been considerable work in the IB literature on the internal governance of MNEs, this 
has drawn principally upon the RBV of the firm, TCE, and its close relation, internalization 
theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976).  
We premise this Focused Issue on the notion that an appreciation of corporate 
governance mechanisms can enrich insights into international business. First, corporate 
governance institutions in a particular country influence its attractiveness for international 
                                                 
1 An exception is Strange and Jackson (2008). 
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investment. These institutions may influence the nature of foreign market entry modes since 
different corporate governance institutions likely have different implications for the most 
appropriate and feasible form of control of foreign activities. They may also influence the 
extent to which the form of market entry can facilitate the transfer of resources from the 
foreign entrant or its access to new resources. Second, the power, influence, and expertise of 
different stakeholders within corporate governance have a strong influence on strategic 
decision-making, in general, and internationalization strategies, in particular. The institutions 
of corporate governance in a particular home country may influence the firm’s ability to 
relocate operations, or the pattern of competitive advantage of the firm. Host country 
corporate governance institutions may also erect a barrier to some types of business practices, 
such as due to differences in the protection of investors or the participation of employees in 
strategic decisions. This may also have implications for the control of complex organizational 
forms such as business groups, subsidiaries of MNEs and alliances. Third, internationalization 
and the activities of MNEs impact corporate governance, by exposing firms to diverse sets of 
institutions and stakeholder pressures. Internationalization may bring pressures from foreign 
investors for greater shareholder value or changes in regulation toward international 
standards.  
 As a result of its international nature, IB research can also enrich corporate 
governance research. First, many of the studies in the corporate governance literature have 
largely focused on firms within one particular country environment, although there is a 
second generation of research examining the effects of different legal systems between 
countries on the nature of governance (Denis and McConnell, 2005).  Corporate governance 
codes are also developing in many different countries (Mallin, 2006). By providing 
comparisons between national institutional contexts, IB research may facilitate a contingent 
perspective on corporate governance mechanisms in different environments. Second, the 
 8
behavior of MNEs in different markets may create a mechanism to facilitate convergence of 
different institutional and governance systems. These activities may facilitate an international 
contextualization for the traditional, context-free AT perspective, the dominant paradigm in 
corporate governance. 
 
The Papers in the Focused Issue 
Following a general call for papers, we received 24 submissions. We first sifted the 
papers for fit with the scope of the Focused Issue, and desk rejected those that did not fit. The 
remaining papers were subject to double blind review according to MIR conventions. As a 
result of this process, we accepted five papers for publication in the Focused Issue. We thank 
the editors of Management International Review for providing us with the opportunity to edit 
this Focused Issue, and also the reviewers who provided very helpful and constructive 
comments that enabled us to develop the five papers presented here. Table 1 contains a 
summary of these five papers.   
Insert Table 1 About Here 
 
 For each paper, Table 1 lists a key research question, the theoretical framework, the 
data and analytical methods, and the main findings. The first two papers, by Tihanyi, 
Hoskisson, Johnson and Wan and by Strange, Filatotchev, Piesse and Lien, both focus on how 
corporate governance components impact upon firms’ foreign direct investment (FDI) 
strategies. Tihanyi et al. argue that international diversification is a means by which firms can 
extend and exploit their technological capabilities, but that diversification is often associated 
with increased hazards and risks. The greater the technological intensity of the firm, the more 
severe will be these hazards and risks, and hence the greater the potential for agency 
problems. Tihanyi et al. further contend that contingent pay (stock options and bonuses) helps 
to focus managers’ attention on the long-term, whilst non-contingent pay (cash compensation) 
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encourages managerial interest in the short-term. Thus they hypothesize that high levels of 
contingent pay provide an incentive for managers to extend their firms’ technological 
competence internationally. In contrast, high levels of non-contingent pay tend to make 
managers more loss-averse and more aware of the risks involved in international 
diversification, and thus less willing to extend their firms’ technological competence 
internationally.  
In a similar vein, Strange et al. consider how firms’ ownership structures may impact 
their FDI location decisions within host economies. They argue that alternative locations not 
only differ in terms of traditional attributes such as labor costs, infrastructure etc., but also in 
terms of risk and that this is even more the case in emerging markets where institutions are 
weak and capital markets are immature. Further, they contend that different types of 
shareholders (family, institutions etc.) are likely to have different attitudes towards risk, with 
some (e.g. family shareholders) being more risk-averse than well-diversified investors (e.g. 
foreign institutional shareholders). Thus, they hypothesize that the ownership structure of the 
firm will be an important determinant of the FDI location choice. 
The next two papers, by Lu, Xu and Liu and by Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, both focus 
on how corporate governance factors impact upon firms’ exporting strategies, and how this 
impact is moderated by the firms’ institutional environment. Lu et al. assert that higher levels 
of exporting increase both the information-processing demands on firms’ top management 
teams and the information asymmetries between shareholders and managers, and this is 
particularly the case in emerging economies. They suggest that outside directors and higher 
CEO shareholdings can alleviate the potential agency problems, and thus give rise to higher 
levels of export intensity, whilst the relationship between concentrated ownership and export 
intensity is non-linear because of the offsetting effects of better monitoring and the pursuit of 
private benefits. Further, they argue that these effects depend upon the firms’ institutional 
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environment, and that more developed institutional environments help reduce firms’ 
transaction and agency costs in the exporting process. 
Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau also address firms’ export strategies, but focus on how firms 
with different ownership structures react in different ways in response to structural reforms in 
their home economies. They argue that structural reform has two broad dimensions: economic 
liberalization, and governance improvements involving the repositioning of the home country 
government as the facilitator of transactions. On the one hand, price liberalization, market 
deregulation, and privatization all increase firms’ opportunities and encourages improvements 
in efficiency and competitiveness, thus facilitating export growth. On the other hand, 
governance improvements help reduce transaction costs and improve efficiency both through 
the reduction and improvement of rules and regulations, and through the better 
implementation of those rules and regulations, again with consequent benefits for export 
growth. Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau further argue that the transaction and agency costs vary 
across different types of firms, and that subsidiaries of foreign firms are the main 
beneficiaries of structural reform, followed by domestic private firms and, finally, by 
domestic state-owned firms. 
The final paper, by Ragozzino, adopts a different perspective, and suggests that the 
equity shareholding taken by parent companies in their cross-border acquisitions will depend 
upon the geographic distance between the home and the host economies. He argues that the 
information asymmetries between the parties in the acquisition will be greater the larger is the 
geographic distance that separates them, and that these asymmetries lead to a parent company 
preference for a partial ownership solution. Further, he suggests that cultural distance and 
political risk both raise the ex post transaction costs for foreign firms, but that these costs will 
be lower in full acquisitions than in partial acquisitions because of the greater degree of 
control implied.  
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Theoretical Perspectives 
 The papers cover a variety of IB environments including both developed and emerging 
markets. The five papers use a variety of theoretical perspectives, notably TCE, the RBV, AT 
and IT. Interestingly, several studies integrate more than one theoretical perspective. This is 
particularly the case in respect of the papers dealing with emerging markets, and reflects the 
arguments of Wright et al. (2005) that doing so may yield important insights. Importantly, 
given earlier comments about the difficulties in accessing data in emerging markets 
(Hoskisson, et al., 2000), some of the studies involve longitudinal research designs and panel 
data analysis techniques. 
 The four theoretical perspectives highlighted above are in many ways 
complementary2. Coase (1937) noted that there were transaction costs in effecting exchanges 
through the market, and that the firm would emerge if the costs of organizing these exchanges 
within an internal hierarchy were lower. Subsequent work by Williamson (1975, 1985) and 
Klein et al. (1978) focused on how transactions differ in terms of attributes such as asset 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency. TCE rests on three behavioral assumptions, namely 
bounded rationality, opportunism, and risk neutrality. The parties to a transaction will choose 
a governance structure that minimizes the expected combined production and transaction 
costs. TCE provides a general theory of the firm, but does not address explicitly the existence 
of the MNE though several authors (notably Teece, 1985, 1986; Madhok, 1997) have 
extended the analysis with this in mind. TCE is thus primarily concerned with the 
determinants of organizational boundaries, in the sense of providing an explanation of which 
activities are brought under hierarchical control within the MNE and which activities are 
coordinated through the market.  
                                                 
2 See Strange and Buckley (2009) for a more extensive comparison of the resource-based view, agency theory, 
internalization theory and transaction cost economics. 
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In contrast, the RBV (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984; 
Barney, 1986, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993; Teece et al., 1997) is 
preoccupied with explaining performance differentials between firms. The objective of the 
firm is above-normal returns from the heterogeneous bundle of (valuable, rare, costly-to-
imitate, non-substitutable and non-tradable) resources that it has at its disposal. These above-
normal returns are viewed by the RBV as rents accruing from the skill or good fortune of the 
firm in adopting strategies that acquire, deploy and manage these resources effectively. These 
resources may form the basis of a sustainable competitive advantage if the rents can be 
protected from ex post dissipation by ‘isolating mechanisms’ (Rumelt, 1984). The greater the 
protection afforded the firm by any or all of these mechanisms, the more it will be able to 
resist the appropriation of its rents. More recent work within the RBV tradition has 
emphasized the potential for augmenting the firm’s asset base through international 
operations (Meyer et al., 2008), rather than just the exploitation of existing resources. 
 There are clear differences in emphasis between TCE and the RBV of the firm, yet 
both are similar in that they emphasize efficiency and assume that the objective of the firm is 
above-normal returns through the exploitation of its firm-specific assets. Little or no attention 
is paid to possible conflicts of interest between different stakeholders within the firm. Yet 
different managers within the same firm often have different objectives, the interests of 
managers and shareholders in listed companies are unlikely to be perfectly aligned and 
partners within joint ventures and/or business groups will typically have different goals. 
These differences are likely to be even more prevalent within MNEs, which operate in many 
different countries with different systems of corporate governance. Both TCE and the RBV 
have little to say about the implications of the conflicting strategic objectives of these 
different groups of stakeholders, and this is where AT can offer a complementary perspective. 
AT is concerned both with the standard principal-agent relationship, in which one party (the 
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principal) delegates work to another (the agent), and with the principal-principal relationship 
(Young et al., 2008). In both cases, the parties within the relationship are engaged in 
cooperative behavior, but are assumed to have different goals and attitudes towards risk.  
 Notwithstanding their different concerns, both TCE and the RBV have a number of 
commonalities with AT (Williamson, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989). All three share similar 
behavioral assumptions; all three acknowledge the importance of uncertainty and information 
asymmetries. Such asymmetries are fundamental to the valuation of assets in TCE. In AT, 
these asymmetries result from the division of labor between the various parties, and the 
consequent uncertainties regarding self-interested behavior that lie at the heart of the agency 
relationship. And all three focus on the firm, and ‘adopt an efficient-contracting orientation to 
economic organization’ (Williamson, 1988: 569).  
 In contrast, IT (North, 1981; 1990; 2007) is primarily concerned with how national 
institutions (here broadly defined as the rules of the game in a society that structure incentives 
in human exchange) affect national economic performance, though there are implications for 
how firm behavior is influenced by the environment in which it operates. Institutions 
determine the costs of acting in various ways in different economic (and political) contexts. 
Different societies create and support different institutions to facilitate business transactions: 
some institutions are more effective than others, and all tend to evolve over time. Some 
societies are characterized by ‘institutional voids’ (Khanna and Palepu, 2000) which lead to 
the emergence of specialized organizational forms (e.g. business groups) to replace the 
missing institutions. In contrast to the emphasis on efficiency in TCE, the RBV and AT, IT is 
not a deterministic theory. As North (1990: 6) points out, ‘the major role of institutions in a 
society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure 
to human interaction.’ Similar challenges are expected to be met in different ways by similar 
firms operating in different environments, or in the same environment at different points in 
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time. Such considerations are particularly important in the IB context for MNEs which must 
operate in several different institutional environments at the same time.  
 
Emerging Research Areas 
The papers presented in this Focused Issue begin to provide new insights into the 
relationships between corporate governance and international business. Many further research 
challenges remain. In this section, we outline five research themes which appear promising, 
and we summarize a future research agenda in Table 2 in relation to each of the five themes 
and the four theoretical perspectives discussed in detail above. 
 
International Diversification  
 The traditional view of international diversification, as articulated by research based 
on TCE and the RBV, is that firms engage in FDI with the intention of both exploiting and 
augmenting its resources in overseas markets. Further research can also consider the role of 
dynamic capabilities and changes in firm boundaries on international diversification.  
AT provides a different perspective on the issue. A number of studies have identified 
two types of associations between environmental dynamism, governance, content and context 
of business strategy (Filatotchev et al.., 2007; Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). First, multi-point 
competition associated with international diversification increases both specialist knowledge 
within top management teams and the ambiguity surrounding managers’ actions. This leads to 
a classic principal-agency problem between investors and management of the subsidiary, 
when outside shareholders are not able to observe and evaluate managers’ strategic decisions 
and their outcomes. Second, from the information-processing perspective, economic and 
institutional transitions increase the complexity of transactions and affect the ways in which 
managers process information when developing corporate strategy (Hoskisson et al.., 2000). 
This may lead to strategic errors even when the interests of managers and shareholders are 
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aligned (Hendry, 2002). These researchers argue that these strategic errors are particularly 
harmful when investors use local firms as an important base for exporting to international 
customers or as suppliers to their global production networks. 
Both perspectives suggest that general governance factors such as ownership structure 
and investors’ direct involvement in the decision-making process should have important 
impacts on the strategic decisions of subsidiaries. For example, Filatotchev et al.. (2008) 
provide evidence that internationalization decisions of MNC subsidiaries in transition 
economies are positively associated with both parent’s ownership in the affiliate and its extent 
of control over the affiliate’s strategic decisions. However, Tien and Chuang (2008) find 
mixed support for an AT perspective of the relationship between CEO compensation schemes 
and internationalization. They find that short-term, long-term and total pay are negatively 
related to internationalization. CEO duality and tenure positively moderate effect of CEO pay 
and performance. Further research from an AT perspective is still needed on the role of 
different ownership configurations and governance structures on international diversification, 
particularly the role of boards. The influence of other stakeholders on international 
diversification has also not been widely considered. Similarly, although there has been some 
attention to the importance of institutional environments and changes in these environments, 
research remains partial in its coverage of the range of institutional contexts identified in 
Hoskisson et al. (2000). 
 
Business Groups  
 Business groups are agglomerations of private-sector firms, and are common in most 
emerging markets (Yiu et al., 2008). From the perspective of TCE and the RBV, business 
groups provide an organizational solution to the high transaction costs caused by institutional 
voids (Khanna and Palepu, 2000) and the associated market imperfections, and by the need 
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for domestic firms to access key resources. Thus the influence of business groups is generally 
perceived as beneficial, although the research on the stability of these configurations is 
limited.  
 AT provides a different perspective. Analysis of the governance roles of the differing 
ownership arrangements in these groups is especially key in the emerging market context. In 
emerging markets, there is typically inadequate disclosure, weak securities regulations and 
other problems that give rise to institutional voids and suggest that improved governance is 
achieved through membership of business groups (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). But, business 
groups may create agency problems through their pyramidal structures of inter-group 
blockholdings that entrench controlling shareholders, usually wealthy families, who run their 
groups to maximize their utility rather than maximizing wealth for all shareholders. As a 
result, traditional principal-agent problems may be replaced by a separate set of agency 
problems associated with principal-principal goal incongruence (Dharwadkar et al., 2000). 
These problems may especially arise in non-Anglo-American contexts. For example, 
there may be a severe mismatch between foreign joint venture partners from an Anglo-
American environment and their counterparts elsewhere. Controlling shareholders in business 
groups may divert resources from joint ventures to other firms they control. Perkins et al. 
(2008) examine these issues in the context of Brazil and find that joint ventures between 
Brazilian telecoms firms and partners from countries where business groups are rarer have 
significantly elevated failure rates. In contrast, they show that joint ventures with foreign 
partners from countries where pyramidal groups are more common are more likely to 
succeed. Further research could usefully examine the impact on international business 
strategy of these mismatches in different environments. More generally, research is needed on 
the processes of governance in different forms of  business groups and in different 
institutional contexts. 
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Entry Modes 
There is a considerable IB literature on what determines whether a foreign MNE will 
opt for a wholly-owned subsidiary when it decides to invest in a host economy, or whether it 
will choose to establish a joint venture with a local partner. Such studies draw primarily upon 
TCE and the RBV, and suggest inter alia that the MNE will opt for the joint venture entry 
mode when the prospective partner possesses complementary resources, when the 
collaboration offers learning opportunities, when fast market access is important, and when 
the MNE wishes to reduce its resource commitment and to share risk. It has also been shown 
that institutional factors such as the cultural distance between the MNE home country and the 
host country will also have an influence.  
But there is increasing recognition that agency hazards may also have an impact upon 
the entry mode decision (Reuer and Ragozzino, 2006). Foreign institutional investors with 
globally diversified portfolios and superior monitoring abilities are more likely to encourage 
high-risk, high-commitment FDI decisions by firms in emerging markets, whereas domestic 
institutions are more likely to form a coalition with risk-averse family block-holders and 
insiders in the parent company, supporting a low commitment entry mode (Douma et al., 
2006; Filatotchev, et al., 2005, 2007). Yet both foreign and domestic investors may be 
heterogeneous. As such, firms with different ownership and governance structures may have 
different approaches to entry as they have different objectives from foreign entry. 
The specific national corporate governance context may also be important. Luo et al. 
(2008) examine the impact of national corporate governance models on inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in emerging economies. Specifically, they examine how family ownership 
and control in large group-affiliated firms in Taiwan affect joint venture investment from US 
and Japanese firms during the period 1988–1998. Their findings that home-country corporate 
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governance models are likely to shape foreign firms' choice of local partners support a neo-
institutional perspective of FDI. More generally, there is a need to consider the relationships 
between different institutional environments and configurations of entry modes for control 
versus resource access or transfer. 
 
Subsidiary Mandates 
 MNEs may establish overseas subsidiaries with various strategic “mandates” relating 
to their decision-making processes and strategy.  These mandates may be determined by the 
MNE’s overall strategy,  but the subsidiary may develop its own resources and capabilities 
that enable it to become more autonomous in pursuing its own (international) entrepreneurial 
activities that the parent could not foresee (Birkinshaw, 1997; Roth and Morrison, 1992).  
However, in these circumstances, foreign MNEs face particular risks associated with  
securing and enforcing contracts (Mudambi, 1999). There is thus a need for research that 
considers the appropriate configuration of subsidiary mandates for resource versus control 
objectives. 
Changes in institutional environments may exacerbate problems where they increase 
the specialist knowledge of subsidiary managers and ambiguity surrounding their actions if 
MNE parents are typically unable to observe their decisions, leading to principal-agency 
problems. Strategic errors may also arise when changing institutional contexts increase the 
complexity of information processing; this can be especially problematical when investors use 
local subsidiaries as a base for exporting or as suppliers to their global production networks. 
Governance mechanisms such as ownership and MNEs’ involvement in the subsidiaries’ 
decision-making processes may be able to offset these problems (Filatotchev et al., 2008).  
However, evidence as yet remains limited on the circumstances under which different 
governance mechanisms work to achieve a balance between permitting subsidiary discretion 
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and ensuring the interests of the parent are pursued. Further studies are needed. For example, 
we know little about the role and composition of subsidiary boards in different markets with 
different subsidiary mandates. Differences in terms of foreign versus local representatives 
may be one important dimension of the variation in board composition. 
 
New International Ownership Structures 
The principal foci of corporate governance and IB research has been on the activities 
of manufacturing and, more recently, service sector firms. Corporate governance research has 
focused on the role and effectiveness of the corporate governance mechanisms in these firms, 
while IB research has focused on their internal control configurations and resource issues. 
However, a set of cross-border owners with different governance characteristics is gaining 
prominence which, through their acquisition of traditional manufacturing and service 
organizations, have major implications for future developments in corporate governance and 
IB. These cross-border owners include private equity (PE) firms, sovereign wealth funds 
(SWFs) and hedge funds.  
 The second wave of private equity backed buyouts that peaked in the middle of 2007 
drew considerable attention for a number of reasons (Cumming et al., 2007; Wright et al., 
2007; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2008). Amongst the aspects attracting attention was the role of 
foreign private equity firms. For example, using data on the population of UK private equity 
backed buyouts over the period 1985-2007, Wright (2008) shows that over this period, the 
number of non-UK private equity backed deals in the United Kingdom had risen almost 
threefold to 57 in 2007, while deal value rose tenfold to some £18 billion.. Non-UK private 
equity firms generally have slightly higher shares of debt but larger equity ownership stakes.  
Non-UK private equity firms have, on average, shorter holding periods for investments than 
do UK private equity firms.  
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 Cross-border venture capital (VC) and private equity investment raises important 
governance issues relating to the monitoring of transactions. Syndication with local partners 
provides a mechanism for foreign VC and PE firms to select better deals and spread risk as 
well as enabling better access to information and involvement for monitoring purposes. Much 
of this literature has focused on the earlier stage venture capital end of the market (Mäkelä 
and Maula, 2006). Such analysis is absent from the PE literature, which is surprising given 
that cross-border syndication in the buyout end of the PE market is extensive (Wright et al., 
2007). Further research might usefully analyze the governance differences between foreign-
local and domestic-domestic VC and PE syndicates. There is also a need to examine 
differences in terms of ownership stakes, use of leverage as a governance device, board 
presence, board composition and reporting requirements between foreign and domestic VC 
and PE firms.  
 While recent theoretical development has contrasted the internal governance (TCE) 
and resource accessing (RBV) rationales for different foreign entry modes in general (Meyer 
et al., 2008), empirical work has not examined these issues in the PE context. Moreover, 
while the coordination problems of VC syndicates have been recognized in relation to 
investee monitoring (Wright and Lockett, 2003), this has not been examined in a cross-border 
context. Different distress regimes between countries (Armour and Cumming, 2006) may 
impact distress costs in failing foreign PE investments and how the restructuring process is 
governed. Further research is needed in this area.  
 SWFs represent a second new type of international investor and which, because of 
their size, rapid growth and lack of transparency have raised concerns about their governance 
impact. Specifically concerns have arisen because of the argument that they may invest for 
strategic rather than economic reasons. Fotak et al. (2008) examine investment patterns 
exhibited by SWFs in 620 equity investments and find that, contrary to perceptions, SWFs 
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generally purchase minority stakes directly from target companies, and that SWFs are 
typically long-term investors who, due to both political pressures and size of holdings, are 
often unwilling to quickly unwind their positions. However, their evidence on negative two-
year abnormal returns of SWFs suggests that these acquisitions are followed on average by 
deteriorating firm performance. However, research is lacking on the effects of SWFs on the 
strategies of the firms in which they invest, including internationalization aspects, that may 
contribute to this performance change.  
 Hedge funds have also grown rapidly as international investors. They typically face 
less regulation than mutual funds and PE funds, although it has been suggested that hedge 
fund managers pursuing strategies with potentially more pronounced agency problems 
systematically select jurisdictions with less stringent regulations (Cumming and Johan, 2008). 
Teo (2008) finds that hedge funds with a physical presence, and hence a local information 
advantage, in their investment region outperform other hedge funds especially in emerging 
markets. However, distant funds are able to raise more capital, charge higher fees, and set 
longer redemption periods, despite their underperformance relative to local funds. Further 
research is necessary to understand the impact of foreign hedge funds on the strategies of 
firms in which they invest. Additional comparative research might consider differences in the 
behavior of hedge funds, private equity funds and SWFs.  
 
Conclusions 
It has been explained that corporate governance structures represent the main channel 
through which a firm’s major decisions may be influenced by its national and international 
environment. As such, it seems inevitable that corporate governance must have a prominent 
role in IB research. Without effective governance, a firm may not allocate additional 
resources efficiently, and may not achieve needed retrenchment and restructuring of 
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resources. It should not be surprising, therefore, that research, including papers in this Special 
Issue, are now exploiting the synergy between research in governance and IB. 
Of course, the very notion of combining IB and governance research seems hopelessly 
optimistic. It was noted above that governance research, even  within a single national context 
(often the USA) has yielded confusing results, after decades of intense effort (Daily et al., 
2003). This may not be surprising when one appreciates all the contextual variations between 
different firms within the same country - they all face variations in formal and informal 
institutions at a local and regional level, different forms of product market competition and 
many other subtle differences. As a result, no consistent governance-strategy-performance 
relationships have yet been established.  
In addition, a variety of theoretical perspectives have been deployed, including the 
five reviewed above, and causation is often difficult to identify. For example, governance may 
influence executive pay structures, executive pay may influence strategic decisions and firm 
risk. Levels of firm risk in turn affect the impact of executive pay and even governance 
structures themselves. 
IB considerations inevitably introduce even more complications and circularities. In 
addition to within-nation variations, firms in different countries face variations in geography, 
climate, language, culture, as well as clearly-identified institutional variations. With so many 
variations in national and infra-national environments, how can empirical and theoretical 
progress be achieved? 
We would argue that the papers presented in this Special Issue represent sensible 
progress. Each presents an IB/governance study in a different institutional context, 
synthesizing at least two theoretical perspectives. Each implicitly respects the uniqueness of 
international firms and the contextual variations they face. This eclectic approach must 
produce incremental theoretical advance that corresponds with casual observation. 
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For example, within the single industry of motor vehicle manufacturing, a wide 
diversity of different governance structures and strategies in different national contexts has 
each achieved survival on international product markets. Ford and Porsche/VW are both 
family-dominated, while Toyota is part of a business group, and GM is a widely-held 
company on the stylized US pattern. Until recently at least, each has been able to achieve 
satisfactory rates of return that have satisfied shareholders and other stakeholders.  
At the time of writing in 2008, however, the state of the global motor industry presents 
new challenges for firms and for IB/governance research. While different governance 
structures and strategies have each been successful in different institutional contexts, how 
successful will they prove in an economic downturn, when the emphasis is on the need to 
reduce output, manning levels and costs? 
In terms of the papers in this Special Issue, the new research focus could be on de-
diversification, the closure of regional facilities, export reductions and equity disposals. In 
turn, the emerging research areas identified could similarly involve de-diversification, the 
contraction of business groups, and new ownership structures and sources of finance in the 
context of financial collapse. Whatever the international economic situation however, the 
importance of managerial entrepreneurship remains and may be enhanced.     
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 Table 1: Summary of Papers in the Focused Issue 
 
Authors     Research Question Theory Data Method Findings
Tihanyi, Hoskisson,  
Johnson and  Wan 
Impact of managerial 
incentives on firms’ 
international 
diversification 
AT; RBV 156 US firms from 
SandP500 in 2002 
OLS Managerial contingent pay (stock options and bonuses) 
has direct impact on international diversification. Both 
contingent and non-contingent (cash compensation) 
pay have a moderating effect on the relationship 
between technical competence and international 
diversification. 
Strange, Filatotchev, 
Piesse and Lien 
Impact of ownership 
structure on FDI 
location decisions 
AT; IB and 
strategy 
perspectives 
121 Taiwanese 
listed companies 
with 285 FRI 
projects in China, 
1999-2003 
Multinomial logit 
analysis 
Shareholdings of controlling family, and of non-family 
insiders, in parent company, and parent shareholding in 
Chinese affiliate, have significant effects on FDI 
location. 
Lu, Xu and  Liu Impact of Board 
characteristics and 
ownership structure 
on firms’ export 
behaviour. 
AT; IT 779 listed Chinese 
manufacturing 
firms, 2002-5. 
Unbalanced panel 
with 2637 firm-
year observations 
Logit and 
conditional logistic 
models for export 
propensity 
Tobit and GMM 
models for export 
intensity 
Ownership concentration, the proportion of outside 
directors, and CEO shareholding all have a positive 
impact upon both export propensity and export 
performance, but the relationship is moderated by the 
level of institutional development of the firms’ home 
location.  
Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Dau 
Impact of structural 
reform on firms’ 
export behaviour. 
IT; RBV; AT 500 Latin 
American firms, 
1990-2005. 
Unbalanced panel 
of 5782 firm-year 
observations. 
Random-effects 
panel logit model 
for export 
propensity 
Random-effects 
panel tobit model 
for export intensity 
The impact of structural reform on the export strategy 
of firms varies with the ownership of the firms. 
Subsidiaries of foreign firms are more likely to become 
exporters and to increase their exports, followed by 
domestic private firms. Domestic state-owned firms are 
not more likely to become exporters and are more 
likely to decrease their exports, relative to subsidiaries 
of foreign firms. 
Ragozzino Impact of geographic
distance on the equity 
shareholding taken 
by parent companies 
in foreign 
acquisitions 
 TCE; 
information 
economics 
608 acquisitions by 
US firms overseas, 
1993-2004 
Tobit analysis US acquirers seek lower equity stakes in distant targets, 
and higher stakes in proximate targets, but effects are 
moderated by both cultural distance and political risk. 
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Table 2: A Future Research Agenda 
 
Theory   International Diversification Entry Modes Business Groups Subsidiary Mandates New International 
Ownership Structures  
RBV, 
TCE 
How do firm dynamic capabilities impact 
international diversification strategy? 
 
How do ICT developments impact firm 
international diversification strategies? What 
are the implications for firm boundaries? Do 
ICT developments facilitate vertical 
integration across national boundaries, or 
lead to greater externalisation of production? 
 
What is the balance 
between corporate 
governance mechanisms 
for control purposes and 
corporate governance to 
bring access to resources? 
 
How does the governance 
of international JVs and 
alliances differ according 
to the nature of the 
partners? 
How stable are the 
corporate governance 
mechanisms in 
business groups? 
What is the appropriate 
configuration of subsidiary 
mandates to obtain control 
and resource objectives? 
What impact do PE, 
VC, SWFs and hedge 
funds have upon firm 
strategy?  
AT What effects do different ownership 
structures have upon firms’ international 
diversification? 
 
What effects does the involvement of various 
non-equity stakeholders (e.g. labour unions, 
NGOs) have upon international
diversification? 
 
 
What are the special 
governance issues in 
family-owned firms, 
cooperatives etc., and 
how do they impact upon 
internationalisation 
strategies? 
 
Do firms with different ownership structures 
favour different internationalisation
strategies (exporting, FDI, alliances etc.)? 
  
How do such changes in ownership impact 
upon internationalisation strategies?  
 
How do internal control mechanisms such as 
the size and composition of the Board of 
Directors, and executive compensation and 
How does corporate 
governance of the focal 
company define the 
choice of entry mode? 
 
 
 
How do we control for 
opportunism of alliance 
partners? 
 
What are the 
processes of 
corporate 
governance/boards 
and IB? How do 
these differ between 
countries? 
 
What is the composition of 
boards in terms of foreign 
members?  
How are PE, VC, 
SWFs and hedge 
funds represented on 
Boards? 
 
To what extent has 
firm strategy become 
financialized?  
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share ownership schemes, affect the 
formulation of international strategy? 
 
IT How do differences between international 
regulatory environments (including 
approaches to corporate governance) affect 
IB strategy? 
 
What impact do institutional transitions have 
upon firms’ strategic choices? 
 
How do differences in the 
institutional environment 
affect the appropriate 
configuration of entry 
modes in terms of control 
and resource 
access/transfer? 
 
How do we address the 
‘innocents abroad’ 
problem of different 
nature of alliance 
partners? 
How does economic 
development fill 
institutional voids 
and affect the 
potency of business 
groups? 
 
 
How does board 
composition vary between 
types of market? 
 
How are subsidiary boards 
constructed and operated in 
different IB environments? 
How do new forms of 
ownership [e.g. 
private equity firms, 
sovereign wealth 
funds] affect the 
nature of corporate 
governance across 
borders? 
 
 
